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Abstract 
This paper defends the claim that the critique of ideology requires creative interventions in the symbolic 
order of society and that those creative interventions must be understood as events. This is what animates 
the work of both Ricœur and Deleuze and yet helps to uncover the fundamental difference between them 
regarding the conditions that make such critique possible: a difference regarding how we understand the 
nature of events. While Ricœur is the philosopher of the narrated event, Deleuze is the philosopher of the 
dramatic event. Instead of pursuing a point-by-point comparison of their respective philosophies of the 
event, a line of social and political inquiry is constructed that leads from Ricœur to Deleuze with a view to 
establishing at what point these two thinkers take different paths. It will be argued that the crossroads is 
rather neatly signposted by Meillassoux’s critique of strong correlationism in After Finitude.  
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Résumé 
Cet article défend la thèse selon laquelle la critique de l'idéologie exige des initiatives créatrices dans l'ordre 
symbolique de la société et que ces initiatives créatrices doivent être comprises comme des événements. 
C'est ce qui anime le travail à la fois de Ricœur et de Deleuze et pourtant contribue à faire apparaître une 
différence fondamentale entre eux, en ce qui concerne les conditions qui rendent possible une telle critique: 
une différence s'agissant de la façon dont nous comprenons la nature des événements. Tandis que Ricœur 
est le philosophe de l'événement narrativisé, Deleuze est le philosophe de l'événement dramatique. Au lieu 
de poursuivre une comparaison point par point de leur philosophie respective de l'événement, l'auteur 
construit un fil conducteur, autour de leur recherche sociale et politique, qui mène de Ricœur à Deleuze, 
en vue d'établir par quelles zones d'intersection ces deux penseurs prennent des chemins différents. Il s'agit 
de montrer que cette croisée des chemins est plutôt bien balisée par Meillassoux, critique du 
"corrélationisme fort", dans son livre Après la finitude.  
Mots-clés : Ricœur, Deleuze, Meillassoux, Evénements, Idéologie 
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 “On what condition is the critique of ideology possible?” 
Ricœur, Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences, 64 
 
There is growing evidence that we should start thinking about the philosophical 
contributions of Ricœur and Deleuze together: especially, with a view to the clarification of key 
concepts and to developing subtle responses to contemporary social and political problems. For 
example, the small extant literature on Ricœur and Deleuze has already established that they 
shared a strong intellectual lineage and trajectory that has yet to be deeply excavated or fully 
understood. Of those that have begun this process, I agree with Olivier Mongin that both 
philosophers shared an antipathy to the overly formal character of Kantian thought and the 
tortured syntheses of the Hegelian system that led each to reflect upon the richly textured and 
intricately refined qualities of life.1 Some of these intricacies have been addressed by Declan 
Sheerin in his nicely intertwined reading of narrative and larval selves, a reading that “places 
Deleuze at the heart of Ricœur and Ricœur on the outside of the inside of Deleuze.”2 Moreover, 
the strong link between these two thinkers on the importance of an ethics that affirms life’s 
creative potential is also becoming increasingly understood as a common well-spring from which 
they draw; a spring that has its source in Spinoza’s Ethics. Pamela Sue Anderson is making 
strides in this direction, from “the Ricœur side” (so to speak) that suggest that those on “the 
Deleuze side” need to catch up with harvesting the fruits of the cross-fertilization of these two 
greats of post-War French philosophy; for the mutual benefit of clarifying elements of each 
other’s philosophy and in pursuit of the shared goal of producing philosophy that affirms rather 
than denies life.3  
It is equally clear from the literature, however, that for all that Ricœur and Deleuze share 
there remain fundamental – by which I mean, foundational and irreconcilable – differences 
between them. For example, Mongin has elegantly summarized his version of this difference: 
Deleuze is the philosopher of excess, Ricœur of debt.4 And Sheerin, for all that he attempts a 
certain reconciliation, notes that it is only possible by situating Deleuze and Ricœur in a world of 
his (that is, Sheerin’s) own making; the world of a “’denarrativized’ self haunted by a virtual 
Aristotle lying in the shadows.”5 So, whatever allegiances we can find between Ricœur and 
Deleuze – and there are many – we must also recognize the lines of variation that condition their 
fundamental difference.  
With this literature in mind, this discussion is aimed at making a small contribution to 
the growing awareness that Ricœur and Deleuze can and should be thought together without their 
philosophical systems being reduced to each other. To this end, I propose my own version of what 
these two thinkers share and where the fundamental difference between them is to be found. 
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First I will claim that Ricœur and Deleuze share a commitment to the critique of ideology. This is 
not a straightforward claim as regards either thinker. Concluding his essay “Science and 
Ideology”, for example, Ricœur said that “nothing is more necessary today than to renounce the 
arrogance of critique.”6 Equally, and dwelling on the other key term for a moment, Deleuze and 
Guattari famously declared in A Thousand Plateaus that “there is no ideology and never has 
been.”7 That said, it is clear that both Ricœur and Deleuze (and Guattari) had particularly 
dogmatic visions of critique and ideology in mind when making these claims and they are, 
without doubt, both indebted to critical philosophy and its role in unsettling our ideologically 
infused habits of mind. Just a few sentences before the end of his essay on “Science and 
Ideology”, Ricœur gives an account of a less dogmatic version of the relationship between 
ideology and critique that could just as easily stand in for Deleuze’s view on the matter as well: 
“the critique of ideology is a task which must always be begun, but which in principle can never 
be completed.”8 This suggests a deeper shared commitment. If the critique of ideology must 
always begin again, it is clear that underpinning this view is a challenge to the universalism of 
Kant’s idea of critique and the historicism of Marx’s theory of ideology.  More particularly, 
though, these challenges point to a deep and shared commitment to developing an 
understanding of what has to happen if the critique of ideology is to become irredeemable within 
the universal and the historical. This is their shared commitment to the category of the event.  
But, secondly, this connection between their respective philosophies points to the 
fundamental difference between them, a difference regarding how we understand the nature of 
events. In the discussion below I will defend the claim that the fundamental difference between 
Ricœur and Deleuze can be understood in these terms: Ricœur is the philosopher of the narrated 
event, Deleuze of the dramatic event. But rather than pursue a point-by-point comparison of their 
respective philosophies of the event, I want to construct a dynamic line of social and political 
inquiry that leads from Ricœur to Deleuze with a view to establishing at what point of the 
journey these two thinkers take different paths. I will show that this crossroads is rather neatly 
signposted by Quentin Meillassoux’s critique of strong correlationism in After Finitude.9 
Ricœur: Ideology, Utopia and Finitude 
In his essay, “Hermeneutics and the Critique of Ideology” Ricœur asks the following 
question: “On what condition is the critique of ideology possible?”10 He does so with a view to 
exposing the shared presuppositions animating the debate between Gadamer and Habermas, a 
debate ostensibly between the competing claims of tradition and reason. By proposing a 
dialectical mediation between tradition and reason, based on the ineluctably re-collective nature 
of anticipations of freedom, Ricœur draws a strong temporal line between past, present and 
future that he develops in a variety of different contexts under the banner of ideology and 
utopia.11 I will briefly review Ricœur’s analysis of the relationship between ideology and utopia 
as it establishes important themes for the claim that I want to make.  
In this analysis, he affirms that ideology is an irremovable aspect of the social imaginary 
against the claims of some Marxists and critical theorists who assert the solely negative 
dimension of ideology as false consciousness. Insisting instead upon the “integrative” function of 
ideology (rather than its inverting or distorting functions), Ricœur was nonetheless acutely aware 
of the spectre of Althusser’s understanding of ideology as a cement that binds human relations 
together. Seeking to avoid the epistemological quagmire into which Althusser was led, Ricœur 
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understood that the dual-level Marxist understanding of reality and its ideological inversion 
could not simply or unproblematically be surpassed by a flat model of ideology where it operates 
solely within or is co-extensive with the symbolic order. Rather, the dimensionality of the 
ideological had to be retained for the distantiation required for a critique of ideology to be 
effective. According to Ricœur, however, this dimensionality should be thought temporally 
rather than spatially, so to speak. That is, he locates a counterpart to ideology within the symbolic 
order that he calls, amongst other things, the utopian imagination. Richard Kearney sums it up 
well: “Resisting the reduction of the social imaginary to ideological distortion [Ricœur] argues 
instead for an affirmation of its utopian potentials.”12 
Ricœur treats ideology and utopia as derived from a common origin – the symbolic order 
or “social and cultural imagination” - and both ideological and utopian symbolizations, he says, 
are “constitutive of social reality.”13 They remain nonetheless distinct: while we tend to associate 
the ideological aspect with claims about reality – about the origins and causes of social 
phenomena – Ricœur rightly asserts that much of the cultural symbolism that we value refers to 
the future, to the wonderful literary, artistic, musical, even philosophical anticipations of what’s 
to come. This utopian aspect of the social imaginary has a futural orientation that Ricœur 
establishes as a critical counterpoint to both the Althusserian equivocation regarding the 
totalizing nature of ideology and the Marxist/Critical Theory dual dimensionality of distorted 
ideology and the undistorted real of the lifeworld.  In this context, therefore, and for all their 
associations with “dreaming” and “impossibilities” – the “no place” they formally designate – 
utopias have a practical function in challenging aspects of the ideological domain, aspects that 
foreclose possible worlds.14 
This utopian orientation to the possibility of worlds to come is a theme I will return to 
later on. For the moment it is important to stress, as Ricœur does, that this dual affirmation of 
ideology and utopia as necessary aspects of the symbolic order is a careful mediation of the 
dichotomy between tradition and reason that places both within the domain of a philosophical 
anthropology. As established in “Hermeneutics and the Critique of Ideology”, both the 
Gadamerian hermeneutics of pre-understanding and the Habermassian critique of ideology 
“cross on a common ground: the hermeneutics of finitude, which secures a priori the correlation 
between the concept of prejudice and that of ideology.”15 Or as Ricœur puts it in the later essay 
“Science and Ideology”: “the properly epistemological difficulties that the social sciences 
encounter under the names of prejudice, ideology and the hermeneutical circle … have the same 
origin. They stem from the very structure of a being which is never in the sovereign position of a 
subject capable of distancing itself from the totality of its conditionings.”16 In answering his 
question about the conditions of the critique of ideology, therefore, Ricœur returns us to the 
limitations of human finitude established by Kant and ontologised by Heidegger, thereby 
reminding Habermas that the ontological turn itself and his critique of it are part of the same 
tradition of post-Kantian philosophy. 
But is Ricœur too wedded to claims of human finitude? It is well established that 
Ricœur’s mediation of the claims of tradition and reason have led to strident responses, especially 
from critical theorists who sense that too much ground has been given to tradition and not 
enough to the claims of reason in his mediation.17 For my part, this debate misses the point. 
Ricœur is surely correct in his claim that hermeneutics and critical theory are both linked by a 
philosophical anthropology derived from claims regarding human finitude. However, it may be 
that it is the common ground of human finitude itself that condemns both the hermeneutic and 
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critical-theoretical perspectives to the ready appropriation of their allegedly emanicpatory 
orientations by ideological forces bent on foreclosing the utopian dreams of possible worlds. It is 
a claim that has been articulated in its most general terms by Meillassoux in his provocative book, 
After Finitude: An Essay On the Necessity of Contingency.  
Meillassoux: Correlationism, Ideology and Fideism 
The importance of Meillassoux’s argument, in this context, is two-fold. On the one hand, 
there is the central claim of his book that philosophy must resolve its contradiction with the 
physical sciences by accepting that it is possible to make claims about the absolute nature of 
reality; claims, that is, not limited by the allegedly finite nature of human knowledge. On the 
other hand, there is a subterranean dimension to Meillassoux’s project that alerts us to the 
possibility that all post-critical philosophies are complicit with the promulgation of a 
contemporary indifference to the world and each other; a mode of indifference he characterizes 
as “fideism.” Fideism is the belief that belief itself is all we have, or as he also puts it, it is the 
“victory of religiosity.” 
According to Meillassoux, philosophy since Kant has been organized around the 
principle of “correlationism.” Correlationism is “the idea according to which we only ever have 
access to the correlation between thinking and being, and never to either term considered apart 
from the other.”18 For correlationists, there can be no direct access to the real. That is, the only 
access to an event, object, law or being that is possible is always indirect by virtue of being 
already correlated with “a point of view.”19 Any account of reality, no matter how richly 
detailed, must ultimately be construed as one that is relative “to us”, to our experience of the 
world as finite beings. What Meillassoux calls the “correlationist two-step” – the variously 
different ways in which philosophers have described this correlation itself – is less important, he 
argues, than the fact that any philosopher aligned to a post-critical heritage will be engaged in 
this dance of thought and being. In these general terms, both Deleuze and Ricœur are 
correlationists (post-Kantians, in a fundamental sense). But what is the problem with 
correlationism, according to Meillassoux? 
Importantly, Meillassoux’s project is not simply to present a refutation of correlationism 
from a straightforwardly realist understanding of the kind of statements produced by science. On 
the contrary, Meillassoux spends much of After Finitude, and subsequent work, upholding the 
implacable nature of the correlationist argument against naïve realism. One cannot, according to 
Meillassoux, simply side-step the “correlationist two-step” in the name of realism. His project is 
subtly different: it is to accept the correlationist qualifier against dogmatic realism but to argue 
that this qualification itself, when absolutized, necessitates that we confront the “irremediable 
reality” of, what he calls, “ancestral statements” (for example, that the accretion of the earth took 
place 4.56 billion years ago).20 According to Meillassoux, therefore, we must remain a 
correlationist against the realist but a realist against the correlationist and we can be both if we 
absolutize the truth “hidden beneath” correlationism. Only in this way will we be able to “get out 
of ourselves, to grasp the in-itself, to know what is, whether we are or not.”21  
The argument he constructs leads the reader through the history of post-Kantian 
philosophy: what he calls, the weak correlationism of Kant, the speculative idealism of dialectical 
and vitalist approaches and the strong correlationism of post-Heideggerian philosophy. It is the 
latter that concerns us here.22 According to Meillassoux, the strong correlationist has convinced 
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us that there is no necessary reason for our not-being, and if this is the case, then this means that 
we always have the capacity to be other than we are. Meillassoux presents this idea as a 
commonplace of post-Heideggerian – or as he has also referred to it, “post-modern” – 
philosophy. In important senses, this is indeed a strong point of contact between Ricœur and 
Deleuze in that they both place a high premium on human creativity and the emergence of the 
new, generally speaking. But, argues Meillassoux, “this capacity-to-be-other cannot be conceived 
as a correlate of our thinking, precisely because it harbours the possibility of our own non-
being.”23 In other words, the strong correlationist has convinced us of the absolute “facticity” of 
our being, but this facticity is no longer a limit to our thought – it is no longer the very marker of 
human finitude - rather it is a feature of our existence that can be thought absolutely (and which 
must be thought absolutely if we are to ward off idealism). This acquires consistency in what 
Meillassoux calls “the principle of factuality”; that is, the absolute contingency of our factual 
existence. As he puts it, the principle “unveils the ontological truth hidden beneath the radical 
skepticism of modern philosophy: to be is not to be a correlate, but to be a fact: to be is to be 
factual- and this is not a fact.”24 Meillassoux concludes that “the equal and indifferent possibility 
of every eventuality” is not a claim that is relative to a human point of view on reality; it is, 
rather, an absolute requirement of the real.25 
The subterranean cultural agenda can be understood by treating After Finitude as a 
contribution to the current debates about science and religion. Meillassoux has in his sights 
contemporary dogmatists of both the religious and the secular variety, as well as agnostics who 
think they are able to remain impartial vis-à-vis such debates and “spiritualists” who invoke the 
world-disclosing nature of some non-material force, such as “spirit”, “will” or “life.” All these 
contributors to the current milieu, on Meillassoux’s terms, are unveiled as idealist 
metaphysicians: that is they are all shown to be purveyors of the claim that there is some ultimate 
reason why everything is as it is and that we can come to know this reason, either in whole or in 
part. The claims to dogmatism that abound in the science-religion debates, therefore rebound on 
all parties from Meillassoux’s perspective because every participant makes claims to the absolute 
necessity of some determinate entity. If dogmatism is unsustainable in the face of correlationism 
and if Meillassoux is correct in arguing that correlationism presupposes a claim about the hyper-
chaotic nature of the real (that every eventuality is equally possible), then all of the dominant 
positions in the science-religion debates are disqualified as illegitimate. It is a claim that renders 
obsolete religious and scientific dogmatism, agnosticism and spiritualism. In his “Preface” to the 
book, Badiou expresses this dimension of Meillassoux’s work well: “It allows thought to be 
destined towards the absolute once more, rather than towards those partial fragments and 
relations in which we complacently luxuriate while ‘the return of the religious’ provides us with 
a fictitious supplement of spirituality.”26 The “speculative, not metaphysical” intervention in this 
cultural milieu is to “think absolute necessity without thinking that anything is absolutely 
necessary”; or, as he also expresses the same point, speculative philosophy is a form of non-
absolutist absolutizing thought.27 
This reference to thinking the absolute without absolutism is not merely a technical use 
of a philosophical concept, it also has the political overtones that one would expect with the use 
of such a term. For Meillassoux, however, we must distinguish between the political absolutism 
that follows from dogmatism and that, more subtle form, which follows from correlationism. In 
what at first appears to be a rather unexpected moment in After Finitude, Meillassoux adds “in 
passing” that to reject dogmatism in thought: 
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furnishes the minimal condition for every critique of ideology, insofar as ideology cannot 
be identified with just any variety of deceptive representation, but is rather any form of 
pseudo-rationality whose aim is to establish that what exists as a matter of fact exists 
necessarily. The critique of ideologies, which ultimately always consists in demonstrating 
that a social situation which is presented as inevitable is actually contingent, is essentially 
indissociable from the critique of metaphysics, the latter being understood as the illusory 
manufacturing of necessary entities.28 
According to Meillassoux, there is a necessary connection between ideological dogmatism and 
metaphysics. In this sense, Meillassoux adopts a broadly Marxist understanding of ideology as a 
distortion of the real. That said, Meillassoux’s primary political target is elsewhere. 
For Meillassoux, the absolutism that accompanies ideological dogmatism is not as 
pressing a problem of contemporary political life as the more subtle form of absolutism that 
accompanies correlationism. He calls this “fideism.” What he describes as the “end of ideology”, 
the victory of correlationist over dogmatic thought, has led to “the unqualified victory of 
religiosity” where thought “has relinquished its right to criticize the irrational.”29 All that 
remains is an absolutism of “belief”: everybody is absolutely entitled to believe what they wish 
about the nature of the real and philosophy is no longer entitled to intervene in those systems of 
belief because it can no longer claim to have any unmediated access to the real as it is in-itself. 
Meillassoux does not shrink from drawing out the political implications of fideism: “if nothing 
absolute is thinkable, there is no reason why the worst forms of violence could not claim to have 
been sanctioned by a transcendence accessible to a select few.”30 With the demise of ideological 
dogmatism, argues Meillassoux, we witness the arrival of fideist fanaticism, an arrival described 
as “the result” of critical rationalism. “Against dogmatism,” he says, “it is important that we 
uphold the refusal of every metaphysical absolute, but against the reasoned violence of various 
fanaticisms, it is important that we rediscover in thought a modicum of absoluteness.”31 
Events: Narrated and Dramatic 
What impact do Meillassoux’s arguments have on the way we establish the 
commonalities and differences between Ricœur and Deleuze? Taking Meillasoux’s claims at face 
value, and to the extent that both Ricœur and Deleuze are post-critical philosophers of the strong 
correlationist variety, it would appear that they are equally implicated in upholding fideism and 
therefore complicit in the legitimization of religious fanaticism. This is not a very comfortable 
place for either thinker! But neither is it the end of the matter.  
There are two responses to Meillassoux’s claims that, we might imagine, both Ricœur 
and Deleuze could agree upon. First, there would be a shared skepticism regarding Meillassoux’s 
presentation of fanaticism as post-ideological. If ideology is derived from a metaphysical view 
that distorts our grasp of reality by finding necessity in contingency and if fanaticism is derived 
from correlationism supported by a fideist “belief in belief” as the source of contingency in any 
necessitarian position then it seems clear that we are dealing with two sides of the social 
imaginary: the ideological and utopian in Ricœur’s terms; or, two sides of the symbolic order, the 
actual and the virtual, in Deleuze’s terms. But both thinkers recognize that, as two sides of the 
same coin, these aspects need to be thought in tandem. Meillassoux, in other words, is too quick to 
cut one off from the other, for both Ricœur and Deleuze. But what is to prevent Meillassoux from 
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simply disagreeing with the two-fold claims of either thinker? This raises the second general 
response. From both a Ricœurian and a Deleuzean perspective, Meillassoux forgets that his own 
argument is embroiled or embedded within its own conditions. That he does this may indeed be 
an example of what Ricœur calls “the arrogance of critique”; that Meillassoux has found the 
unconditioned within the conditioned confines of Kantian and post-Kantian critique.32 But it is 
also an instance of what Deleuze described as the eighth and fundamental postulate of the 
dogmatic image of thought; that knowledge has priority over learning.33 
Despite these two rejoinders, I do want to hold on to a version of Meillassoux’s basic 
claim; namely, that the critique of ideology (now understood to include Meillassoux’s 
characterization of fideism) requires that we are able to think that every eventuality is equally 
possible. Is this a claim that either Ricœur or Deleuze could uphold? If not, then I do think that 
we have grounds to question the sustainability of their putative desire to critique our 
ideologically infused habits of mind. 
This raises the question of their shared commitment to the importance of events. First it 
requires that we think the singular event; what Foucault once referred to as “the singularity of 
events outside of any monotonous finality.”34 As is clear from any engagement with his work 
and the commentary that has followed from it, Ricœur is a philosopher with a strong 
commitment to the creative dimension of the utopian imagination that may be said to serve as the 
basis for a Ricœurian understanding of the singular event. And it is a commitment that Deleuze 
would appear to share, even on similar grounds: “give me something that’s possible or I’ll 
suffocate. What’s possible doesn’t pre-exist, it’s created by the event. It’s a matter of life. The 
event creates a new existence, it produces a new subjectivity.”35 But, even if Deleuze is using 
language similar to Ricœur here, the similarity is only apparent.  
The merely apparent nature of this agreement can be revealed if we ask this question: is 
Ricœur a thinker of the singular event? This is no doubt a complicated issue worthy of further 
investigation, but as Anna Borisenkova has argued, for all of Ricœur’s sensitivities to life’s 
creative twists and turns and to complex social phenomena, in Ricœur’s hands “the event loses 
its independence.”36 While in agreement with this claim, I do think that we need to dig a little 
deeper to get to the problem. What is it in Ricœur’s philosophy of the event that means that the 
event “loses its independence”? In offering a Deleuzean answer to this question, it is also possible 
to begin to articulate his theory of the singular event. From a Deleuzean perspective, the 
ideology-utopia couple that animates Ricœur’s critical utopianism is ultimately a version of the 
real-possible couple. As such, it removes the conditions required of singular events to the extent 
that Deleuzeans are committed to Bergson’s critique of the real-possible couple in the name of the 
actual-virtual couple as the only two-fold understanding of reality that allows for the emergence 
of the radically new.37 So, despite a shared commitment to the fundamental role of events in the 
critique of ideology the difference between them is that Ricœur’s narrative encasement of the 
event locates it in a real-possible logic that Deleuze criticizes on the (Bergsonian) grounds that the 
real will always curtail the possible and therefore nothing new – other than that already 
contained within the real – will ever be thought to emerge. The distinction between the narrative 
encasement and the dramatic liberation of the event is summed up well in The Logic of Sense: 
The role played [by an actor] is never that of a character; it is a theme (the complex theme 
or sense) constituted by the components of the event, that is, by the communicating 
singularities effectively liberated from the limits of individuals and persons…The actor 
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thus actualizes the event, but in a way that is entirely different from the actualization of 
the event in the depth of things. Or, rather, the actor redoubles this cosmic, or physical 
actualization, in his own way, which is singularly superficial – but because of it more 
distinct, trenchant and pure. Thus, the actor delimits the original, disengages from it an 
abstract line, and keeps from the event only its contour and splendour, becoming the actor 
of one’s own events – a counter-actualisation.38 
The dramatic recovery of events provides a basis for understanding the singularity of 
events on the grounds that every dramatization is always already a creation.39 That this is the 
case is premised on Deleuze’s two-fold ontology of virtual/actual itself a critique of the 
real/possible couple that underlies, in this case, the narrative creativity of the utopian imagination 
in the face of ideological appropriation. For Deleuze, singular events are understood as dramatic 
changes in the intensive domain that traverses the symbolic order. While narrative pulls the 
event and its possibilities back to the real, to tradition through narration, drama unleashes the 
event and its virtualities into the future and in this way they are always singular events capable 
of providing the conditions for the critique of ideology.  
This contrast between narrated and dramatic events must not be treated in an overly 
dogmatic manner, not least because of Ricœur’s claim regarding “the capacity of utopia to break 
through the thickness of reality.”40 This capacity is also clearly signaled by Ricœur when he says 
that “the difference between something which is purely an ideology reflecting one particular time 
and something which opens outward to new times is that the latter does not merely mirror what 
presently exists.”41 Indeed, this awareness of the disruptive power of utopia can be understood 
as part of Ricœur’s consistent concern with the nature of creativity and the dynamic interplay 
between the real and the possible that prevents one from being subsumed by the other. This is 
given a fitting metaphor in the closing line of Lectures on Ideology and Utopia when Ricœur argues 
that we only come to know the appropriate relationship between ideology and utopia in a 
process of “practical wisdom” that helps us “understand how the circle [of ideology and utopia] 
can become a spiral.”42  
Within these claims there would appear to be a moment of creativity similar to Deleuze’s 
understanding of the dramatic event as a moment of creative counter-actualisation. While this is 
certainly worthy of further detailed investigation, the concern remains that no matter how much 
dynamism Ricœur introduces to his analyses it is always a dynamism that occurs within the 
frame of the real and the possible. For example, this would seem to be the case given that Ricœur 
is committed to the idea that our practical judgment about the role of utopias must always assess 
the disruptive potential they have against “what is fitting in a given situation.”43 It is a difference 
that may be symbolised, in the first instance at least, as that between Ricœur’s insistence upon 
breaking the interpretive circle to create a spiral and Deleuze’s insistence that the dynamic 
interaction of the virtual and actual dimensions of the symbolic order produce lines of flight; in 
this context, lines of flight are dramatic events that surpass the “given situation” and “the 
possibilities” it contains. 
Conclusion 
It is my suggestion that “Ricœurians” and “Deleuzeans” look to the complex 
relationships between narrated and dramatic events for further resources to deepen the 
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connections and heighten the tensions between these two greats of post-World War II French 
philosophy. By way of conclusion, I offer three potentially fruitful lines of further enquiry. 
a) To the extent that both Ricœur and Deleuze articulated a two-fold account of the real 
and that they do so with a view to avoiding both the flat Althusserian model of ideology and the 
Marxist depth model, there would seem to be very good grounds for further inquiry (on the 
Deleuze side of this relationship, especially) into the nature of ideology with the aid of both 
thinkers. While there is work in the commentaries on Deleuze that addresses his relationship to 
ideology44, there is clearly more to be done in this regard for “Deleuzeans to catch-up with 
Ricœurians.”  
b) It has been argued that the two-fold ontology of virtual/actual in Deleuze can provide 
the grounds for an immanent form of utopianism.45 On this basis there would appear to be 
another good resource for deepening the “disjunctive synthesis” between the two thinkers and, 
no doubt, much for Deleuze scholars to learn from the subtle work on utopianism being done in 
the name of Ricœur.  
c) While the narrated and dramatic events are certainly different, further implications of 
this difference may be brought to light by distinguishing their respective theories from that of 
another event-oriented philosopher, Alain Badiou. As an opening provocation: does Deleuze’s 
theory of the dramatic event avoid the pitfalls of both Badiou’s treatment of the event as a “cut in 
being” and the idea of an event saturated by its narrative meaning?46  
These avenues for further research are merely three of an, in principle, endless number of 
projects that could spring from greater collaboration and confrontation (in the best possible way) 
between those who work under the respective banners of Ricœur and Deleuze. Perhaps, in 
bringing together these divergent lines of inquiry something new will happen; maybe even an 
event in thought that will challenge our ideological habits of mind. 
 
Iain MacKenzie 
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